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ere dragons real? Can squirrels sail? Do bears rape people? Taken out 
of context, such questions seem a bit ridiculous. The answer seems 
both illusive and obvious: No. To distill literary tales about animals 
into such simple questions about truth and fiction risks missing their point: they 
focus on the wrong parts of the story, fixate on the literal embedded in the 
metaphorical. Yet we start here to offer an incitement we think useful at this 
critical moment for those of us studying human entanglements with animal lives 
in the past: what would it mean to answer yes? What is historical in fiction? And 
what is fabulous in history? What is the role of fabulous animals in historically-
minded critical animal studies?  
Up at least through the end of the seventeenth century, the word 
“fabulous” was a synonym for a particular kind of story: mostly classical 
mythology, but also fables, that narrative genre in which animals, mountains, or 
other supposedly voiceless things spoke, squabbled, and taught humans lessons 
in wariness, justice, and, especially, social conservatism.1Collections of fables 
were foundational to medieval and early modern training in both literacy and the 
affiliated skill of interpretation, and therefore also taught readers the necessity of 
distinguishing fiction from truth. Young readers learned that while the narrative 
itself was merely fabulous, the moral that followed the story (the epimythium) or 
prefaced it (the promythium) was meant to provide a good, true lesson. Fiction 
had its value because it was understood to be a vehicle for making the hunt for 
truth a game.2  
Most fable collections therefore led off with a story designed to teach 
proper practices of reading: many began with a rooster that prefers a dunghill to 
the gem it finds in it. The usual ending lesson explains that we should not be like 
the rooster, preferring the base animal materials to the true moral values secreted 
within these squalid and puerile narratives; another epimythium instead teaches 
that we should be like the rooster and know our place, leaving the gems for 
those who can appreciate them.3 Either way, the animal material is meant to be 
understood as “fabulous,” fictional, connotatively equivalent to myths or even to 
false hopes, as when a fourteenth-century English translator of a Latin history 
sneers at the “fabulous” apocalyptic political hopes of the Welsh.4 The other 
material, the moral, is meant to be understood as abstractly true, suitable for 
reasonable creatures like the elite, literate, generally male humans who 
themselves so rarely appear in fable narratives. 
This interpretative split works best with stories of talking animals: the 
clever fox who convinces a crow that its voice is beautiful, and then absconds 




song; the lion whose legal speech bullies other predators into giving him their 
shares of a carcass; the mice who convince a sleeping lion that only a tyrant 
would punish them for the lèse-majesté committed when they scampered across 
his vast body as he slept: given the general humanist conviction that animals had 
no spoken language, and certainly no language that could be shared between 
species, these kinds of fables would have been easy to understand as mere 
fictions, with the animals mere materializations of certain moral qualities, like 
credulousness, gluttony, and meekness. If the trait is noble, then that too is 
imaginatively surrendered to humans: in Phillip Sidney’s “Philisides,” for 
instance, each beast offers its present to humanity: “the fox its craft,” the 
crocodile, “its tears,” and the cony, “its skill to build.”5  
It works less well, however, when the animal behaves only like any other 
animal of its species. A rooster would probably prefer the contents of a dunghill 
to the beauty of a gem. The rooster’s thoughts about the gem may be only 
fictional, but the rooster’s behaviors are exactly what one would expect. For this 
supposedly “fabulous” story, a certain kind of truth resides on the side of the 
narrative, one perhaps more solid than a moral that might change from telling to 
telling, or that might be ignored, misused, or otherwise waylaid by the fable’s 
reader. A rooster stands on a dunghill, eating what can be eaten: this really seems 
to have the quality of truth, because it exists regardless of what the reader thinks 
about it. 
Yet truths more “fabulous”—in a modern sense of the word—can still 
be found on the narrative side of things. Not all the animal narratives are either 
obviously false stories of animal intelligence or true stories of unadorned bestial 
appetites. One popular fable features a story of a clever and patient animal, 
whose standard epimythia aims to teach exactly these qualities. This is the fable 
of the crow and pitcher, which appears in Avianus’s foundational Latin 
collection, in the late medieval collections of Caxton and his source, Steinhöwel, 
and in other compendia through to our present.6 A crow finds a pitcher, its base 
full of water, and cannot get its beak down the pitcher’s narrow neck. We might 
imagine another fable of a clever crow that tricks a hapless monkey, equally 
thirsty, into tipping the contents of the pitcher down the crow’s throat. Instead, 
in the actual fable, the crow plunks a succession of pebbles into the pitcher to 
displace the water up through its neck. The clever, patient crow quenches his 
thirst, and, by imitating it, we learn, as Caxton explains, “that wytte or fapyence 
is a moche fayr vertue, for by fapyence or wytte, thow Ihalt mowe refyfte to all 
faultes.” This wit of the crow is, in fact, the wit of a crow: crows really can do 
this.7 These notoriously clever birds have become the darlings of ethology, and 
of posthumanists eager to crowd nonhumans in on humans’ arrogant claims to 
lonely rationality. It could have been found in classical natural history, which 
from Pliny through the bestiaries, held that crows were absolutely dedicated to 
their nestlings and the recipients of news of the future from God Himself (even 
if Isidore’s Etymologies, a foundational medieval encyclopedia, complained that 
such belief was “a great sin”).8  Instead, we have a fable of crows being crows as 
we know them. And as we know them, we stop being so sure of the mere 
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fabulousness of fables, or we find new wonder in the world we thought we 





Still more fabulous behavior need not be sought out only among 
mythical hybrids and other monsters. The “fabulous” animal—in the sense of 
animals that inspire wonder, a suspension of certainty— could just as well be 
sought at home, among the jumble of outmoded and disdained knowledges of 
the Middle Ages and early modern periods. For prior to the rise of modern 
animal science, what might strike us as only mundane animals were thought to 
practice a wide range of naturally bizarre behavior. Consider, for instance, the 
account of sailing squirrels in Edward Topsell’s History of Foure-Footed Beasts:  
 
when hunger or some conuenient prey of meat costraineth her to passe 
ouer a riuer, shee seeketh out soe rinde or small barke of a Tree which 
shee setteth vppon the Water, and then goeth into it, and holding vppe 
her taile like a saile, letteth the winde driue her to the other side. 
 
Topsell names Olaus Magnus as his source; this fact also appears in Olaus’ 
contemporary Conrad Gesner. The belief in sailing squirrels appears as early as 
the thirteenth century, in the natural histories of Vincent of Beauvais and 
Thomas of Cantimpré, the latter of which would be adapted delightfully in this 
medieval Dutch verse, “ende [the squirrel] sitter op, alst in een scip ware, / ende 
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metten staerte seyltet over dare.” Even Carl Linnaeus includes sailing squirrels in 
his great work of taxonomy (“superfluum cibum defodit; Cortice interdum 
navigat”), while it shows up as late as the children’s classic Squirrel Nutkin.9 
Needless to say, squirrels do not actually navigate across rivers on scraps of 
wood, using their tails as sails. But for nearly five hundred years, the most 
reputable scientific sources believed they did. There was the fabulous, up in a 
tree, just outside our window. 
Let this be a temptation to imagine outdated ethologies as other sites of 
the fabulous, the mythical, the strange. Too often this material continues to be 
considered embarrassing, too often subjected to what we might call scientific 
Euhemerizing. Skeptical ancients, Christian and pagan both, insisted that 
centaurs were “really” just very able riders, and that the gods had once been only 
human heroes with names like Zeus or Hercules, and more recent rationalists 
have held that supposed werewolves were really just people with hypertrichosis, 
that is, thick hair growth all over the body. By the same logic, we might imagine 
that someone had once perhaps witnessed a squirrel afloat on a bit of wood 
amid a swollen river, and perhaps that squirrel had leapt to the bank and 
scampered up an acorn-swollen tree. But what of it? If this had been the origin 
of a story that in the thirteenth century entered squirrel lore — a rather thin 
archive, to be sure —it still does not exhaust the thrill of imagining that these 
nimble creatures in times of need collectively decide to become sailors. What 
wonder! This ethology should be taken as a kind of counternatural natural 
history, not as yet another record of power/knowledge or mere delivery to the 
mastery of instrumental reason, but rather as a site of resistance to the 
complacency of the known, and of the domestic, even parochial certainty that 
the fabulous can only be expected “out there.”  
The category “nature” too often functions as the great comforting 
“ought”: it is what we ought not to be (because we are civilized); it is what we 
ought to be (because we are God’s creatures, or because of the implacable and 
inevitably antifeminist rationality of genes). Counternatural history, materials 
from nonhumans that topple our natural categories, is fabulous history, a yoking 
of these opposites that speaks fiction and truth at the same time: a truth infested 
with the uncertainty of fiction.  
One last example before we introduce the articles themselves: we 
recommend Colin Dickey’s recent review of Marah J. Hardt’s Sex in the Sea, 
which, like Joan Roughgarden’s Evolution’s Rainbow, frustrates any attempt to 
ground a supposedly fundamental gender binary in nature. 10 Dickey begins 
“First, it’s important to ruin Finding Nemo for you.”11 We might humbly suggest 
the following revision: First, it’s important to make Finding Nemo fabulous. 
The natural world swarms with parthenogenetic female wasps, 
multigendered flounders, while the vast majority of life — which is microscopic 
— reproduces without sexual congress at all. Amid these swarms, we hairy 
terrestrial vertebrates are the aberrations.12 We are the fabulous animals. This is 
not a matter of playing the cosmopolitan skeptic, like Montaigne, and simply 
seeing things from another perspective, but rather of recognizing how very 
parochial our way of life is. The other perspective really ought to be the default. 
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Properly understood, Nemo made “weird” by an accurate natural history is far 
less fabulous than we bare, forked, generally binary creatures are.   
This collection of essays and responses is thus our attempt to capture 
some of the lively debate around these issues that happened last spring at the 
2015 Annual Meeting of the Shakespeare Association of America.13 There, two 
very different seminars on animal studies—Karen Raber’s seminar on “animal 
materialism” as well as ours on “animal encounters”—allowed a group of us 
working in medieval, early modern, and Enlightenment-era critical animal studies 
to begin a conversation about our shared approaches and our differences in 
studying animals: For whom are we speaking when we write about animals? 
Should our work actively contribute to improving animal lives? What do we 
mean by the term animal and what is included in its definition? And, perhaps 
most surprising: are we working on “real” animals?  
These essays and their responses have been curated to reflect this 
encounter: We’ve chosen the theme of fabulous animals as a reminder that 
animals and the stories we tell about them have long and complicated histories. 
What are the fictions embedded in our current material investments in animal 
lives? What are the roles of fabulous animals (and fabulous knowledge about real 
animals) in this field that has been dominated by historicist methods of research? 
To begin to capture the liveliness of our debate, we’ve invited participants from 
both seminars to write and respond: all of the essays focus on animals that are 
fabulous in a modern sense, in that they seem more the stuff of history or myth. 
A few are fabulous in early modern ways, in that they seem to materially emerge 
from classical myth or from the “native” mythical materials of Germanic 
legend—the dragon at the heart of Jan Stirm's essays. Others are more familiar, 
like the cats rendered diabolical through witchcraft in Chris Clary’s essay. Some 
emerge as fabulous only when interpreted against our human scales of 
measurement—the squirrels elevated on shields in Kathryn Will’s study of 
armory. And some frustrate both material and mythical approaches—the single 
bee that Keith Botelho traces in his essay. Read together, these animals are both 
familiar and fabulous.  And, as our three respondents argue in their thoughtful 
and generous readings of the essays, these animals provide a way to evaluate 
both where the field has been focused in the past and where it might be heading. 
That dragons and bees are discussed here with historicist methods, while 
cats and squirrels take on sinister and noble allegorical meanings is an irony not 
lost on us, and hopefully not on you. The dragons, satanic cats, bees, heraldic 
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